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Shuiyin Liu, Yi Hong, and Emanuele Viterbo
Abstract
The artificial noise (AN) scheme, proposed by Goel and Negi, is being considered as one of the key
enabling technology for secure communications over MIMO wiretap channels. However, the decrease in
secrecy rate due to the increase in the number of Eve’s antennas is not well understood. In this paper, we
develop an analytical framework to characterize the secrecy rate of the AN scheme as a function of Eve’s
SNR, Bob’s SNR, the number of antennas in each terminal, and the power allocation scheme. We first
derive a closed-form expression for the average secrecy rate. We then derive a closed-form expression
for the asymptotic instantaneous secrecy rate with large number of antennas at all terminals. Finally, we
derive simple lower and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous secrecy rate that provide a tool for
the system design.
Index Terms
artificial noise, secrecy capacity, physical layer security, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of data transmissions is a fundamental issue in wireless communication systems, where the
broadcast characteristics make it difficult to prevent eavesdropping. Traditional key-based cryptography
[1–3] usually is based on the assumption that the eavesdropper (Eve) has limited computational resources.
These algorithms ensure that it is computational infeasible to decipher the encrypted messages without
knowledge of the secret key. On the other hand, assuming Eve has unlimited computational power, Wyner,
in [4], analyzed how one can reliably send information over a discrete memoryless wiretap channel. Wyner
showed that, if Eve intercepts a degraded version of the intended receiver’s (Bob’s) signal, the transmitter
(Alice) can limit the information leakage by means of channel coding. The associated notion of secrecy
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1capacity was introduced to characterize the maximum transmission rate from Alice to Bob, below which
Eve is unable to obtain any information.
Wyner’s original work provided the theoretical foundation for keyless security, namely physical layer
security. Several studies have been made to generalize Wyner’s wiretap channel model. For example, in
[5], Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman studied the Gaussian wiretap channel and showed that a positive
secrecy capacity exists only when Eve’s channel is of lower quality than that of Bob. In [6], the authors
considered a non-degraded version of Wyner’s wiretap channel. The notion of wiretap channel has also
been extended to fading channels. For quasi-static fading channels, the outage probability of secrecy
capacity is derived in [7]. For the ergodic fading channel, [8] provides a detailed analysis of secrecy
capacity. In [9], the secrecy capacity region of a multiple-access channel with confidential messages
is derived. The secure transmissions over multiple-output multiple-input (MIMO) wiretap channels are
studied in [10]. The achievable average secrecy rate has been widely adopted as a metric of security
[7–11].
In the context of wiretap code design, Csisza´r [12] proposed the strong secrecy criterion, i.e., lim
n→∞
I(u;
y) = 0, which implies that the overall information leakage between the message u and Eve’s channel
output y should vanish as the codeword length n tends to infinity. Polar codes achieving strong secrecy
over discrete memoryless channels have been proposed in [13]. For Gaussian wiretap channels, nested
lattice codes achieving strong secrecy were proposed in [14]. In particular, polar codes in [13] and lattice
codes in [14] were shown to achieve semantic security [2]. In [15], Oggier et al. showed that it is possible
to construct lattice codes that maximizes Eve’s error probability.
Instead of only relying on the randomness of communication channels, physical layer jamming tech-
niques were proposed to increase secrecy rate. In [11], Goel and Negi showed that it is possible to align
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), so called “artificial noise” (AN), within the null space of a
MIMO channel between Alice and Bob, thus only Eve is jammed. The idea of AN has been extended to
various system models [16–20]. When the number of Bob’s antennas NB is one, the asymptotic analysis
of the secrecy capacity was derived in [16], and its power allocation scheme was presented in [17]. In the
case of imperfect channel state information, an average minimum mean square (MSE) uplink-downlink
duality was derived in [18]. More recently, we have shown that Eve’s error probability can be maximized
by any randomly distributed AN (not necessarily Gaussian) [19]. In the existing AN-based schemes, it is
commonly assumed that the number of Eve’s antennas NE is smaller than the number of Alice’s antennas
NA, i.e., NE < NA [11,17,20]. However, the relationship between the secrecy rate and unbounded NE
has never been explored.
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2In this work, we characterize the exact secrecy rate of the original AN scheme [11] for any Eve-to-
Bob channel noise-power ratios using various AN power allocation schemes, with arbitrary number of
antennas at each terminal. Our contributions are three-fold: firstly, we derive a closed-form expression for
the average secrecy rate; secondly, we derive a closed-form expression for the asymptotic instantaneous
secrecy rate as the number of antennas in each terminal becomes large; and finally, we derive lower
and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous secrecy rate, leading to simple sufficient and necessary
conditions that guarantee positive average/instantaneous secrecy rate.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the system model, followed by the analysis of
secrecy rate in Section III. Section IV provides lower and upper bounds on the secrecy rate. Conclusions
are drawn in Section V. Proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper and lowercase boldface letters, and
the Hermitian transpose, inverse, pseudoinverse of a matrix B by BH , B−1, and B†, respectively. |B|
denotes the determinant of B. Let the random variables {Xn} and X be defined on the same probability
space. We write Xn
a.s.→ X if Xn converges to X almost surely or with probability one. In denotes the
identity matrix of size n. An m × n null matrix is denoted by 0m×n. A circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variable x with variance σ2 is defined as x ∽ NC(0, σ2). The real, complex, integer and
complex integer numbers are denoted by R, C, Z and Z [i], respectively. I(x; y) represents the mutual
information of two random variables x and y. We use the standard asymptotic notation f (x) = O (g (x))
when lim sup
x→∞
|f(x)/g(x)| < ∞. ⌈x⌋ rounds to the closest integer. A central complex Wishart matrix
A ∈ Cm×m with n degrees of freedom and covariance matrix Σ, is defined as A ∽Wm(n,Σ). We write
, for equality in definition.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider secure communications over a three-terminal system, including a transmitter (Alice), the
intended receiver (Bob), and an unauthorized receiver (Eve), equipped with NA, NB, and NE antennas,
respectively. The signal vectors received by Bob and Eve are
z = Hx+ nB, (1)
y = Gx+ nE, (2)
where x ∈ CNA×1 is the transmit signal vector, H ∈ CNB×NA and G ∈ CNE×NA are the respective
channel matrices between Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, and nB, nE are AWGN vectors with i.i.d.
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3entries ∼ NC(0, σ2B) and NC(0, σ2E). We assume that the entries of H and G are i.i.d. complex random
variables ∼ NC(0, 1).
Without loss of generality, we normalize Bob’s channel noise variance to one, i.e.,
σ2B = 1, (3)
and accordingly normalize the total average transmission power E(||x||2), as in [21].
A. Artificial Noise Scheme
The AN scheme assumes NB < NA, in order to ensure that H has a non-trivial null space Z = null(H)
(such that HZ = 0NB×(NA−NB)) [11]. Let H = UΛVH be the singular value decomposition (SVD) of
H, then we can write the unitary matrix V as
V = [V1,Z], (4)
where the NB columns of V1 span the orthogonal complement subspace to the null space spanned by
the columns of Z.
Using the AN scheme, Alice transmits
x = V1u+ Zv = V

 u
v

 , (5)
where u ∈ CNB×1 is the information vector and v ∈ C(NA−NB)×1 is the “artificial noise”. For the purpose
of evaluating the achievable secrecy rate, both u and v are assumed to be Gaussian circularly symmetric
random vectors with i.i.d. complex entries ∼ NC(0, σ2u) and NC(0, σ2v), respectively.
Equations (1) and (2) can then be rewritten as
z = HV1u+HZv + nB = HV1u+ nB, (6)
y = GV1u+GZv + nE. (7)
From (6) and (7), we note that v only degrades Eve’s channel, but does not affect Bob.
In our paper, we assume the worst-case scenario for Alice and Bob described in [11]:
• Alice has only the knowledge of H.
• Eve has the knowledge of H, G, Z and V1.
Different from [11], we assume no upper bound on NE.
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4Since V is a unitary matrix, the total transmission power can be written as
||x||2 =

 u
v


H
VHV

 u
v

 = ||u||2 + ||v||2. (8)
We set the average transmit power constraint P ,
P = E(||x||2) = Pu + Pv, (9)
where
Pu = E(||u||2) = σ2uNB,
Pv = E(||v||2) = σ2v(NA −NB),
(10)
are fixed by the power allocation scheme that selects the balance between σ2u and σ2v .
B. Instantaneous and Average Secrecy Capacities
The idea underpinning the AN scheme is to increase secrecy capacity by jamming Eve. We recall from
[22] the definition of instantaneous secrecy capacity:
CS , max
p(u)
{I(u; z)−I(u;y)} . (11)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions p (u).
We remark that CS is a function of H and G, which are embedded in z and y. To average out the
randomness of CS, we further define the average secrecy capacity, as in [11]
C¯S , max
p(u)
{I(u; z|H)−I(u;y|H, G)} , (12)
where I (X;Y |Z) , EZ [I (X;Y ) |Z], following the notation in [21].
Since closed form expressions for CS and C¯S are not always available (except for the following Theorem
3 given in Sec. III.E), we often resort to the corresponding secrecy rates, given by
RS , I(u; z)−I(u;y), (13)
R¯S , I(u; z|H)−I(u;y|H,G), (14)
assuming Gaussian input alphabets, i.e., v and u are mutually independent Gaussian vectors with i.i.d.
complex entries NC(0, σ2v) and NC(0, σ2u), respectively.
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5C. System Parameters
We define Bob’s and Eve’s SNRs as
• SNRB , σ2u/σ2B
• SNRE , σ2u/σ2E
To simplify our notation, we define three system parameters:
• α , σ2u/σ
2
E (SNRE)
• β , σ2v/σ
2
u (AN power allocation)
• γ , σ2E/σ
2
B (Eve-to-Bob noise-power ratio)
Note that SNRB = αγ. If γ > 1, we say Eve has a degraded channel. Since we have normalized σ2B
to one, we can write (10) as
• Pu = αγNB
• Pv = αβγ(NA −NB)
III. SECRECY RATE WITH GAUSSIAN INPUT ALPHABETS
In this section, we first derive a closed-form expression for the average secrecy rate in (14) with
Gaussian input alphabets. We then present an asymptotic analysis on the instantaneous secrecy rate in
(13). Finally, we show average secrecy capacity in (12) is achieved with Gaussian input alphabets when
NE ≤ NA −NB. To present our result, we define some useful functions.
A. Definitions
We first define the following function (see [23])
Θ(m,n, x) , e−1/x
m−1∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
2l∑
i=0
{
(−1)i(2l)!(n −m+ i)!
22k−il!i!(n −m+ l)!
·

2(k − l)
k − l

 ·

2(l + n−m)
2l − i

 · n−m+i∑
j=0
x−jΓ(−j, 1/x)
}
, (15)
where
(a
b
)
= a!/((a − b)!b!) is the binomial coefficient, n ≥ m are positive integers, and Γ(a, b) is the
incomplete Gamma function
Γ(a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
xa−1e−xdx. (16)
We further define
Nmin , min {NE, NA −NB} , (17)
Nmax , max {NE, NA −NB} , (18)
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6Nˆmin , min {NE, NA} , (19)
Nˆmax , max {NE, NA} . (20)
Finally, we define a set of NA power ratios {θi}NA1 , where
θi ,
{
α 1 ≤ i ≤ NB
αβ NB + 1 ≤ i ≤ NA (21)
B. Average Secrecy Rate
A closed-form expression for R¯S in (14) can be derived using the results from [21, Th. 2], [23, Th.
1] and [24, Th. 1], leading to the following theorem.
Theorem 1:
R¯S = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)− Ω, (22)
where Θ(·, ·, ·) is given in (15),
Ω =


K
Nˆmin∑
k=1
det
(
R(k)
)
, β 6= 1
Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, α), β = 1
(23)
K =
(−1)NE(NA−Nˆmin)
ΓNˆmin(NE)
2∏
i=1
µmiNEi
2∏
i=1
Γmi(mi)
∏
i<j
(
µi − µj
)mimj , (24)
Γk(n) =
k∏
i=1
(n − i)!,
and µ1 > µ2 are the two distinct eigenvalues of the matrix diag
({
θ−1i
}NA
1
)
, with corresponding
multiplicities m1 and m2 such that m1 +m2 = NA. The matrix R(k) has elements
r
(k)
i,j =


(µei)
NA−j−di (NA − j)!
(NA − j − di)! , Nˆmin + 1 ≤ j ≤ NA
(−1)di ϕ(i, j)!
(µei)
ϕ(i, j) + 1
, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nˆmin, j 6= k
(−1)diϕ(i, j)!eµei
ϕ(i, j)∑
l=0
Γ(l − ϕ(i, j), µei)
(µei)
l + 1
, otherwise
(25)
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7where
ei =
{
1 1 ≤ i ≤ m1
2 m1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ NA
di =
ei∑
k=1
mk − i,
ϕ(i, j) = NE − Nˆmin + j − 1 + di.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 gives the exact value of R¯S for the AN scheme, as a function of SNRB (αγ), SNRE (α),
power allocation scheme (β), NA, NB and NE. Note that (22) can be expressed in terms of a finite number
of incomplete Gamma functions, thus provides a closed-form expression for R¯S.
C. Asymptotic Instantaneous Secrecy Rate
The instantaneous secrecy rate RS in (13) is a function of H, V and G. Since we assumed that the
realizations of H, V and G are known to Eve, she is able to compute the exact value of RS. However,
Alice only knows the realizations ofH andV, and can only assume thatG is a random matrix. Therefore,
RS is a random variable from Alice’s perspective. We will consider this point of view when designing
the secure communications system and we will use random matrix theory to characterize the asymptotic
behavior (in terms of number of antennas) of the normalized instantaneous secrecy rate RS/NB. We then
show by simulation that the asymptotic behavior is a very accurate approximation even for very small
numbers of antennas.
The following theorem proves that RS/NB converges to a constant value, which depends only of the
system parameters: α, β, γ, Pu, Pv, and the asymptotic number of antenna ratios. A special case of this
result for β = 1 was given in [25]. Here, we provide a unified result for arbitrary β.
Theorem 2: As NA, NB, NA−NB and NE →∞ with NA/NE → β1, NA/NB → β2 and NB/NE → β3,
RS
NB
a.s.→ Φ(Pu, β2)−
1
β3
(β1V(δ)− log δ + δ − 1)
+
1
β3
Φ
(
Pv
γ(β1 − β3)
, β1 − β3
)
, Ψ, (26)
where
Φ (x, y) = y log
(
1 + x− 1
4
F (x, y)
)
− F (x, y)
4x
+ log
(
1 + xy − 1
4
F (x, y)
)
, (27)
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8F (x, y)=
(√
x (1 +
√
y)2 + 1−
√
x (1−√y)2 + 1
)2
, (28)
V(δ) = 1
β2
log
(
1 +
δPu
γβ3
)
+
(
1− 1
β2
)
log
(
1 +
δPv
γ(β1 − β3)
)
, (29)
and δ is the solution of the equation
β1 =
1− δ
1− η(δ) , (30)
η(δ)=
1
β2
(
1 +
δPu
γβ3
)−1
+
(
1− 1
β2
)(
1 +
δPv
γ(β1 − β3)
)−1
. (31)
Proof: See Appendix B.
In the special case of β = 1, according to the definitions of Pu and Pv given in Sec. II.C, we have
Pu
γβ3
=
Pv
γ(β1 − β3)
. (32)
According to [26, Eq. 2.121], the explicit solution of (30) is
δ = 1−
F
(
Pu
γβ3
, β1
)
4Pu
γβ3
. (33)
By substituting (32) and (33) into (26), we have
RS
NB
a.s.→ Φ(Pu, β2)−
Φ(Pu/(γβ3), β1)
β3
+
Φ(Pu/(γβ3), β1 − β3)
β3
, (34)
which coincides with [25, Th. 3].
D. Asymptotic Approximation of Average Secrecy Rate
Theorem 2 shows that the random variable RS/NB converges almost surely to a constant Ψ given in
(26), as the number of antennas at each terminal goes to infinity. Hence, also the average normalized
secrecy rate converges to the same constant, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Under the same assumptions of Theorem 2,
R¯S
NB
→ Ψ, (35)
where Ψ is given in (26). Then we can write that
R¯S ≈ NBΨ , R¯S,Asym. (36)
for a sufficiently large number of antennas.
Proof: The proof is straightforward.
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Fig. 1. R¯S vs. γ and NE with α = 3 dB, β = −3 dB, NA = 6 and NB = 3.
Corollary 1 provides an alternative way to evaluate R¯S. To use the asymptotic approximation R¯S,Asym
for a finite system model, we substitute in Ψ
β1 = NA/NE, β2 = NA/NB, and β3 = NB/NE. (37)
Remark 1: For finite system models, we verified by simulations that the difference between R¯S and
R¯S,Asym is indistinguishable if
min {NA, NB, NA −NB, NE} > 2. (38)
Example 1: Let us apply Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to the analysis of an AN scheme with NA = 6,
NB = 3 and α = 3 dB. Fig. 1 shows the value of R¯S with β = −3 dB, as a function of γ and NE.
In Fig. 2, we fix γ = 3 dB and verify the relationship between β, NE and R¯S. Both figures show an
excellent agreement between the theoretically derived R¯S and Monte Carlo simulation and the asymptotic
approximation R¯S,Asym.
Moreover, Fig. 1 shows how R¯S increases with increasing γ and decreases with increasing NE. In
Fig. 2, we observe that increasing β (i.e., increasing AN power) has little effect on increasing R¯S when
NE > NA.
E. Achieving Average Secrecy Capacity
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for the achievability of the average secrecy capacity
(12) using Gaussian input alphabets.
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Fig. 2. R¯S vs. β and NE with α = 3 dB, γ = 3 dB, NA = 6 and NB = 3.
Theorem 3: If NE ≤ NA −NB, as α, β →∞, then
C¯S = R¯S = C¯Bob, (39)
where C¯Bob represents Bob’s average channel capacity.
Proof: See Appendix C.
According to (12), a universal upper bound on the average MIMO secrecy capacity is given by
C¯S ≤ max
p(u)
{I(u; z|H)} = C¯Bob. (40)
Remark 2: Combining (39) and (40), we can show that the maximum average MIMO secrecy capacity
is achieved by using the AN transmission scheme and Gaussian input alphabets, if NE is not larger that
NA −NB .
IV. LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS ON SECRECY RATE
To guarantee positive average/instantaneous secrecy rate, in this section, we present simple sufficient
and necessary conditions, based upon lower and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous secrecy rate
using Gaussian input alphabets.
A. Bounds on Average Secrecy Rate
The following theorem bounds R¯S given in (22).
Theorem 4:
R¯LB ≤ R¯S ≤ R¯UB, (41)
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Fig. 3. R¯S and R¯LB vs. NE with α = 3 dB, β = 1 dB, γ = 6 dB, NB = 3 and NA = 4.
where the equality holds if β = 1,
R¯LB = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)
−Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, θmax), (42)
R¯UB = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)
−Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, θmin), (43)
θmin , min{α,αβ},
θmax , max{α,αβ}, (44)
and Θ(·, ·, ·) is given in (15).
Proof: See Appendix D.
Example 2: Fig. 3 compares the values of R¯S, R¯UB, R¯LB as functions of NE with α = 3 dB, β = 1
dB, γ = 6 dB, NB = 3 and NA = 4. Note that the upper and lower bounds are become tighter as β
approaches 0 dB.
B. Bounds on Instantaneous Secrecy Rate
We then provide lower and upper bounds on the instantaneous secrecy rate RS in (13) for high SNRB.
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Theorem 5: Let NA, NB, NA −NB and NE →∞ with NA/NE → β1, NA/NB → β2, NB/NE → β3,
and let Pu, Pv →∞, then almost surely (i.e., with probability one)
RS/NB ≥ ∆(Amax),
RS/NB ≤ ∆(Amin), (45)
where the equality (i.e., almost sure convergence to ∆(·)) holds if β = 1,
ρ , β1 − β3,
Amin , min
{
Pv
γρ
,
Pu
γβ3
}
,
Amax , max
{
Pv
γρ
,
Pu
γβ3
}
, (46)
∆(x) ,
(
log Puβ2 − (β2 − 1) log
(
1− β−12
)− 1)−̥(x) + Ξ, (47)
̥(x) ,


β2
(
log x− 1− β1
β1
log (1− β1)− 1
)
, β1 ≤ 1
β−13
(
log xβ1 − (β1 − 1) log
(
1− β−11
)− 1) , β1 > 1
(48)
Ξ ,


(β2 − 1)
(
log
Pv
γρ
− 1− ρ
ρ
log (1− ρ)− 1
)
, ρ ≤ 1
β−13
(
log
Pv
γ
− (ρ− 1) log (1− ρ−1)− 1) . ρ > 1 (49)
Proof: See Appendix E.
C. Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for R¯S, RS > 0
Theorem 5 shows that the random variable RS/NB is almost surely bounded by the constant values
∆(Amax) and ∆(Amin) given in (50). Then the average normalized secrecy rate is also bounded by the
same values, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: Under the same assumptions of Theorem 5,
R¯S/NB ≥ ∆(Amax),
R¯S/NB ≤ ∆(Amin), (50)
where ∆(·) is given in (47). The equality holds if β = 1.
Proof: The proof is straightforward.
The bounds in (45) and (50) enable the following simple sufficient and necessary conditions for positive
instantaneous and average secrecy rate.
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Corollary 3: Let NA, NB, NA −NB and NE →∞ with NA/NE → β1, NA/NB → β2 and NB/NE →
β3. Then a sufficient condition for positive instantaneous and average secrecy rate is given by
lim
Pu,Pv→∞
∆(Amax) > 0, (51)
and a necessary condition for positive instantaneous and average secrecy rate is given by
lim
Pu,Pv→∞
∆(Amin) > 0, (52)
where ∆(·) is given in (47).
Proof: The proof is straightforward.
To use Corollary 3 for finite (relatively small) SNRB and number of antennas, we substitute in ∆(·)
β1 = NA/NE, β2 = NA/NB, β3 = NB/NE,
Pu = αγNB and Pv = αβγ(NA −NB). (53)
Thus ∆(·) reduces to a function of NA, NB, NE, α, β and γ.
Remark 3: We verified by simulation that Corollary 3 is accurate for finite system models, when
min {αγ, αβγ} ≥ 4,
min {NA, NB, NA −NB, NE} > 2. (54)
Example 3: We consider an AN scheme with NA = 6, NB = 3, α = γ = 3 dB and β = 1 dB.
Fig. 4 shows the value of R¯S/NB, ∆(Amax) and ∆(Amin) as functions of NE. By direct computation,
∆(Amax) > 0 until NE > 12 and ∆(Amin) < 0 when NE > 16. It was observed experimentally in Fig.
4 that R¯S > 0 when NE < 12 and R¯S = 0 when NE > 16.
Compared to the expressions in Theorems 1 and 2, the sufficient and necessary conditions for positive
average/instantaneous secrecy rate in Corollary 3 are much easier to compute, and can be used for system
design. For example, from Alice’s perspective, given NA, NB, α, β and γ, she can easily predict the
number of antennas Eve needs to drive the secrecy rate to zero.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the artificial noise scheme in a situation where Eve has unlimited
number of antennas. We derived closed-form expressions for the average secrecy rate and the asymptotic
instantaneous secrecy rate. The proposed analysis allows a simple evaluation on the secrecy rate with
any SNRB, SNRE, NA, NB and NE, and extends previous studies that were limited to either the case of
NE < NA or the case of NB = 1.
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Fig. 4. Plot of R¯S, ∆(Amax) and ∆(Amin) vs. NE with α = γ = 3 dB, β = 1 dB, NB = 3 and NA = 6.
In the second part of this paper, we have derived lower and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous
secrecy rate. Moreover, simple sufficient and necessary conditions for positive average and instantaneous
secrecy rate have been derived. These easily computable conditions provide Alice and Eve with design
tools for choosing system parameters.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Recalling that
R¯S = I(u; z|H)−I(u;y|H,G). (55)
In what follows, we evaluate I(u; z|H) and I(u;y|H,G), respectively. We treat H and G as Gaussian
random matrices.
1) I(u; z|H)
Since (HV1) (HV1)H = HHH , using [21, Th. 2] and [23, Th. 1], we have
I(u; z|H)
= EH
(
log
∣∣INB + αγHHH∣∣)
= Θ(NB, NA, αγ), (56)
where Θ(x, y, z) is given in (15).
2) I(u;y|H,G)
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Since all entries in H and G are mutually independent, I(u;y) can be expressed as a function of
these independent random entries. This allows us to take two steps to compute the expected value of
I(u;y): we first compute I(u;y|G) given H, then compute EH [I(u;y|G)|H]. The advantage is that
for given H, V = [V1, Z] is a fixed unitary matrix. Then, using [27, Th. 1], GV1 and GZ are mutually
independent complex Gaussian random matrices with i.i.d. entries ∼ NC(0, 1).
Let G1 = GV1, G2 = GZ, W1= G1GH1 and W2= G2GH2 . According to [21], for given H, we
have
I(u;y|G)
= EG1,G2
(
log
∣∣INEσ2E + σ2uW1+σ2vW2∣∣∣∣INEσ2E+σ2vW2∣∣
)
= EG1,G2

log
∣∣∣INE + σ2uσ2EW1+σ2vσ2EW2
∣∣∣∣∣∣INE+σ2vσ2EW2
∣∣∣


= EG1,G2 (log |INE + αW1+αβW2|)− EG2 (log |INE+αβW2|) . (57)
According to [21, Th. 2] and [23, Th. 1], the second term of (57) equals to
EG2 (log |INE+αβW2|) = Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ), (58)
where Θ(x, y, z), Nmin and Nmax are given in (15), (17) and (18), respectively.
To compute the first term of (57), we rewrite αW1+αβW2 as G3∆GH3 , where
G3 = [G1,G2] , (59)
∆ =diag
(
{θi}NA1
)
. (60)
θi is defined in (21). We define
Ω = EG1,G2 (log |INE + αW1+αβW2|) . (61)
Case 1: If β = 1, using [21, Th. 2] and [23, Th. 1], we have
Ω = EG3
(
log
∣∣INE + αG3GH3 ∣∣) = Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, α), (62)
where G3, Nˆmin and Nˆmax are given in (59), (19) and (20), respectively.
Case 2: If β 6= 1, ∆−1 contains two groups of coinciding eigenvalues. According to [24, Th. 1], we
have
Ω = EG3
(
log
∣∣INE +G3∆GH3 ∣∣) = K Nˆmin∑
k=1
det
(
R(k)
)
, (63)
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where K and R(k) are given in (24) and (25), respectively.
Based on (57), (58), (62) and (63), we have
I(u;y|H,G)
= EH (I(u;y|G)|H)
= Ω−Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ). (64)
By substituting (64) and (56) into (55), we have
R¯S = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)− Ω. (65)

B. Proof of Theorem 2
Recalling that
RS = I(u; z) − I(u;y). (66)
In what follows, we evaluate I(u; z) and I(u;y), respectively.
1) I(u; z)
Similarly to (56), we have
I(u; z) = log
∣∣INB + αγHHH ∣∣ . (67)
Since Alice knows the realization of H, she is able to compute the deterministic value of I(u; z). As
NA and NB →∞ with NA/NB → β2, the following limit holds [26, Eq. 1.14]
I(u; z)
NB
→ Φ (Pu, β2) , (68)
where Φ (x, y) is given in (27).
2) I(u;y)
Similarly to (57), we have
I(u;y) = log |INE + αW1+αβW2| − log |INE+αβW2| , (69)
where G1 = GV1, G2 = GZ, W1 = G1GH1 and W2 = G2GH2 .
From Alice side, V = [V1, Z] is a fixed unitary matrix and G is a Gaussian random matrix. Using
[27, Th. 1], G1 and G2 are mutually independent complex Gaussian random matrices with i.i.d. entries
∼ NC(0, 1).
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According to [26, Eq. 1.14], as NA − NB and NE → ∞ with NA/NE → β1 and NB/NE → β3, i.e.,
(NA −NB)/NE → β1 − β3,
log |INE+αβW2|
NE
a.s.→ Φ
(
Pv
γ(β1 − β3)
, β1 − β3
)
. (70)
Let W3 = αW1+αβW2. We can rewrite W3 as Gˆ3TGˆ
H
3 , where
Gˆ3 =
[
1√
NE
G1,
1√
NE
G2
]
, (71)
T = NEdiag
(
{θi}NA1
)
, (72)
where the θi’s are given in (21). Note that the entries of Gˆ3 are i.i.d. complex random variables ∼ NC(0,
1/NE).
According to [26, Th. 2.39], as NA and NE →∞ with NA/NE → β1,
log |INE +W3|
NE
a.s.→ β1V(δ)− log δ + δ − 1, (73)
where V(δ) is given in (29) and δ satisfies
β1 =
1− δ
1− η(δ) , (74)
with η(δ) given in (31).
From (68), (70) and (73), as NA, NB, NA −NB and NE →∞ with NA/NE → β1, NA/NB → β2 and
NB/NE → β3,
RS
NB
a.s.→ Ψ, (75)
where the constant Ψ is given in (26). 
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that using Gaussian input alphabets, if NE ≤ NA−NB, I(u;y|H,G)→ 0 as α, β →∞.
We follow the definitions in the proof of Theorem 1. Based on (57), for a given realization of H, we
have
I(u;y|G)
= EG1,G2
(
log
∣∣INEσ2E + σ2uW1+σ2vW2∣∣∣∣INEσ2E+σ2vW2∣∣
)
a≤ EG2
(
log
∣∣INEσ2E + σ2uEG1 (W1)+σ2vW2∣∣∣∣INEσ2E+σ2vW2∣∣
)
= EG2

log
∣∣∣INE + σ2vσ2E+NBσ2uW2
∣∣∣∣∣∣INE + σ2vσ2EW2
∣∣∣

+NE log σ2E +NBσ2u
σ2E
, (76)
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where (a) holds due to the concavity of log-determinant function and Jensen’s inequality.
Let
W =
{
G2G
H
2
GH2 G2
if NE ≤ NA −NB
if NE > NA −NB
,
i.e., W ∼WNmin(Nmax, INmin).
Recalling the definitions of α and β in Sec. II.C, and based on Sylvester’s determinant theorem and
[23, Th. 1], the first term of (76) can be rewritten as
EG2

log
∣∣∣INmin + αβ1+αNBW
∣∣∣
|INmin + αβW|


= Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ/(1 + αNB))−Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ) (77)
where Θ(x, y, z) is given in (15).
From (76) and (77), we have
I(u;y|H,G) = EH [I(u;y|G)|H]
≤ NE log(1 + αNB)−Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)
+Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ/(1 + αNB))
= (NE −Nmin) log αNB +O
(
1
α
)
+O
(
1
β
)
. (78)
Based on (78), if Nmin = NE, i.e., NE ≤ NA −NB, as α and β →∞,
I(u;y|H,G) = 0. (79)
Under the same conditions, by substituting (79) into (14), we have
R¯S = I(u; z|H) = C¯Bob, (80)
where C¯Bob represents Bob’s average channel capacity. The last equation holds since the input u is a
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with zero mean and covariance σ2uINB [21, Th.
1].
On the other hand, from (12), we have
C¯S ≤ max
p(u)
{I(u; z|H)} = C¯Bob. (81)
Based on (80) and (81), as α, β →∞, if NE ≤ NA −NB,
C¯S = R¯S = C¯Bob. (82)

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D. Proof of Theorem 4
We follow the definitions in the proof of Theorem 1. We first bound the term Ω in the expression of
R¯S given in (26). Recalling that
Ω = EG1,G2 (log |INE + αW1+αβW2|) . (83)
Let θmin = min{α,αβ} and θmax = max{α,αβ}. Since W1 and W2 are positive semidefinite
matrices, using [28, Eq. 12, pp. 55], we have
|INE + αW1+αβW2|
≥ |INE + θmin(W1+W2)|
=
∣∣INE + θminG3GH3 ∣∣ , (84)
and
|INE + αW1+αβW2|
≤ |INE + θmax(W1+W2)|
=
∣∣INE + θmaxG3GH3 ∣∣ , (85)
where G3, Nˆmin and Nˆmax are given in (59), (19) and (20), respectively. The equality holds if β = 1.
Based on (83), (84) and (85), using [21, Th. 2] and [23, Th. 1], we have
Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, θmin) ≤ Ω ≤ Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, θmax), (86)
where Θ(x, y, z) is given in (15).
By substituting (86) into (22), we have
R¯LB ≤ R¯S ≤ R¯UB,
where
R¯LB = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)
−Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, θmax), (87)
R¯UB = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)
−Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, θmin). (88)

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E. Proof of Theorem 5
We follow the definitions in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 4. Based on (67), (69), (84) and (85), we
have
RS ≥ log
∣∣INB + αγHHH∣∣+ log |INE+αβW2|
− ∣∣INE + θmaxG3GH3 ∣∣ , RLB, (89)
RS ≤ log
∣∣INB + αγHHH∣∣+ log |INE+αβW2|
− ∣∣INE + θminG3GH3 ∣∣ , RUB. (90)
The equality of the random variables RS = RLB = RUB holds if β = 1, since θmin = θmax.
We then evaluate RLB and RUB. For convenience, we define
ρ , β1 − β3,
Amin , min
{
Pv
γρ
,
Pu
γβ3
}
,
Amax , max
{
Pv
γρ
,
Pu
γβ3
}
.
Similarly to the proof in Theorem 2, using [26, Eq. 1.14], as NA, NB, NA −NB and NE → ∞ with
NA/NE → β1, NA/NB → β2 and NB/NE → β3,
log
∣∣INB + αγHHH ∣∣
NB
a.s.→ Φ (Pu, β2) , (91)
log |INE+αβW2|
NE
a.s.→ Φ
(
Pv
γρ
, ρ
)
, (92)
∣∣INE + θmaxG3GH3 ∣∣
NE
a.s.→ Φ (Amax, β1) , (93)∣∣INE + θminG3GH3 ∣∣
NE
a.s.→ Φ (Amin, β1) , (94)
where Φ (x, y) is given in (27).
We then evaluate the function Φ (x, y). From (27), since F (x, y) = F (xy, y−1), it is easy to show
the following property
Φ (x, y) =
Φ
(
xy, y−1
)
y−1
. (95)
Recalling [26, Examples 2.14&2.15], if y ≤ 1,
lim
x→∞
(
log x− Φ(x, y)
y
)
=
1− y
y
log (1− y) + 1. (96)
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Using (95) and (96), we have the following results on the non random quantities Φ(Pu, β2), Φ(Pv/(γρ), ρ),
Φ (Amax, β1) and Φ (Amin, β1).
Since β2 > 1, i.e., NA > NB,
lim
Pu→∞
(log Puβ2 − Φ(Pu, β2))
= lim
Pu→∞
(
log Puβ2 −
Φ(Puβ2, β
−1
2 )
β−12
)
= (β2 − 1) log
(
1− β−12
)
+ 1. (97)
If ρ ≤ 1,
lim
Pv→∞
(
log
Pv
γρ
− Φ (Pv/(γρ), ρ)
ρ
)
=
1− ρ
ρ
log (1− ρ) + 1. (98)
If ρ > 1,
lim
Pv→∞
(
log
Pv
γ
−Φ
(
Pv
γρ
, ρ
))
= lim
Pv→∞
(
log
Pv
γ
− Φ
(
Pv/γ, ρ
−1
)
ρ−1
)
= (ρ− 1) log (1− ρ−1)+ 1. (99)
If β1 ≤ 1,
lim
Pu,Pv→∞
(
logAmax − Φ (Amax, β1)
β1
)
=
1− β1
β1
log (1− β1) + 1, (100)
lim
Pu,Pv→∞
(
logAmin − Φ (Amin, β1)
β1
)
=
1− β1
β1
log (1− β1) + 1. (101)
If β1 > 1,
lim
Pu,Pv→∞
(logAmaxβ1 −Φ (Amax, β1))
= lim
Pu,Pv→∞
(
logAmaxβ1 −
Φ
(
Amaxβ1, β
−1
1
)
β−11
)
= (β1 − 1) log
(
1− β−11
)
+ 1, (102)
lim
Pu,Pv→∞
(logAminβ1 −Φ (Amin, β1))
= lim
Pu,Pv→∞
(
logAminβ1 −
Φ
(
Aminβ1, β
−1
1
)
β−11
)
= (β1 − 1) log
(
1− β−11
)
+ 1. (103)
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Based on the above analysis, as NA, NB, NA −NB, NE →∞ with NA/NE → β1, NA/NB → β2 and
NB/NE → β3, and for Pu, Pv →∞
RLB/NB
a.s.→ ∆(Amax),
RUB/NB
a.s.→ ∆(Amin), (104)
where ∆(·) is given in (47).
Using (89), (90) and (104), under the above conditions, we have (45). 
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